PAPERS | DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY & RISK

Barkley-Levenson, E.E. & Fox, C.R. (2016). The surprising relationship between indecisiveness and impulsivity. Personality & Individual Differences, 90, 1-6.

de Palma, A., Abdellaoui, M., Attanasi, G., Ben-Akiva, M., Fehr-Duda, H., Erev, I., Fok, D., Fox, C.R., Hertwig, R., Picard, N., Wakker, P.P., Walker, J.L. & Weber, M. (2014). Beware of black swans: Taking stock of the description-experience gap in decision under uncertainty. Marketing Letters, 25, 269-280.

Hadar, L., Sood, S., and Fox, C.R. (2013). Subjective knowledge in consumer financial decision making. Journal of Marketing Research, 50, 303-316.

Fernbach, P.M., Rogers, T., Fox, C.R., and Sloman, S.A. (2013). Political extremism is supported by an illusion of understanding. Psychological Science, 24, 939-946.

Fox, C.R., and Tannenbaum, D.  (2011).  The elusive search for stable risk preferences.  Frontiers in Psychology, 2:298.  doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00298

Schonberg, T., Fox, C.R., and Poldrack, R.A. (2011). Mind the gap: Bridging economic and naturalistic risk-taking with cognitive neuroscience.  Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 11-19.

Hadar, L. and Fox, C.R. (2009). Information asymmetries in decisions from description versus decisions from experience.  Judgment and Decision Making, 4, 317-325.

Morris, M.W., Carranza, E., and Fox, C.R. (2008). Mistaken identity: Activating conservative political identities induces “conservative” financial decisions.  Psychological Science, 19, 1154-1160.

Bearden, J.N, Wallsten, T.S., and Fox, C.R. (2007). Contrasting stochastic and support theory explanations for subadditivity.  Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 51, 229-241.

Fox, C.R. and Hadar, L. (2006). Decisions from experience = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004).  Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 159-161.

See, K.E., Fox, C.R., and Rottenstreich, Y. (2006). Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 32, 1385- 1402.

Fox, C.R. (2006). The availability heuristic in the classroom: How soliciting more criticism can boost your course ratings.  Judgment and Decision Making, 1, 86-90.

Fox, C.R. and Clemen, R.T. (2005). Subjective probability assessment in decision analysis: Partition dependence and bias toward the ignorance prior. Management Science, 51, 1417-1432. (Named Best Paper in Decision Analysis 2005, INFORMS).

Trepel, C., Fox, C.R., and Poldrack, R.A. (2005). Prospect theory on the brain? Toward a cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk.   Cognitive Brain Research, 23, 34-50.

Fox, C.R. and Levav, J. (2004). Partition-edit-count: Naïve extensional reasoning in conditional probability judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 626-642.

Sloman, S., Rottenstreich, Y., Wisniewski, E., Hadjichristidis, C., and Fox, C.R. (2004). Typical versus atypical unpacking and superadditive probability judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 30, 573-582.

Fox, C.R., and Rottenstreich, Y. (2003). Partition priming in judgment under uncertainty. Psychological Science, 14, 195-200.

Fox, C.R. and Birke, R. (2002). Forecasting trial outcomes: Lawyers assign higher probabilities to scenarios that are described in greater detail.  Law and Human Behavior, 26, 159-173.

Fox, C.R., and Weber, M. (2002). Ambiguity aversion, comparative ignorance, and decision context. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88, 476-498.

Fox, C.R., and Levav, J. (2000). Familiarity bias and belief reversal in relative likelihood judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 82, 268-292.

Fox, C.R. (1999). Strength of evidence, judged probability, and choice under uncertainty. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 167-189.

Moore, D.A., Kurtzberg, T., Fox , C.R. and Bazerman, M. (1999). Positive illusions and forecasting errors in mutual fund investment decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 2, 95-114.

Fox, C.R., and Tversky, A. (1998).  A Belief-based account of decision under uncertainty.  Management Science, 44, 879-895.

Reprinted in D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Eds. (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Reprinted in E.Shafir (Ed). (2004).  Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings of Amos Tversky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fox, C.R., and Irwin, J.R. (1998). The role of context in the communication of uncertain beliefs. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 57-70.

Fox, C.R., B.A. Rogers, and Tversky, A. (1996). Options traders exhibit subadditive decision weights. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 13, 5-17.

Fox, C.R., and Tversky, A. (1995). Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 585-603.

Reprinted in D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Eds. (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Reprinted in E.Shafir (Ed). (2004).  Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings of Amos Tversky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tversky, A., and Fox, C.R. (1995). Weighing risk and uncertainty.  Psychological Review, 102, 269-283.

Reprinted in D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, Eds. (2000). Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Reprinted in E.Shafir (Ed). (2004).  Preference, Belief, and Similarity: Selected Writings of Amos Tversky. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fox, C.R., and Kahneman, D. (1992). Correlations, causes, and heuristics in surveys of life satisfaction. Social Indicators Research, 28, 221-234.

Fox, C.R., Erner, C. & Walters, D. (2015). Decision under risk: From the field to the lab and back. Chapter in G. Keren & G. Wu (Eds.).  Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making. New York: Wiley.

Fox, C.R., and Poldrack, R.A. (2014).  Prospect theory and the brain. Chapter in Glimcher, P., Fehr, E. (Eds). Handbook of Neuroeconomics (2nd Edition, revised & updated)New York: Elsevier.

Fox, C.R., and Poldrack, R.A. (2008). Prospect theory and the brain. Chapter in Glimcher, P., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Poldrack, R. (Eds). Handbook of Neuroeconomics.  New York: Elsevier.

Fox, C.R. and See, K.E. (2003). Belief and preference in decision under uncertainty. Chapter in D. Hardman and L. Macchi (Eds.), Thinking: Current Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment, and Decision Making (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley).

Fox, C.R., and Levav, J. The Construction of absolute versus relative belief. Working Paper, UCLA Anderson School, Revision Requested, Psychological Review.

Hofree, G., Erner, C. Fox, C.R., Kutson, B. & Winkielman, P. The influence of incidental affect on risky choice. Working Paper, University of California, San Diego.

Hadar, L. and Fox, C.R. Data, belief, and preferences in decision under uncertainty. Working paper, Interdisciplinary Center, Herziliya.

Langer, T., and Fox, C.R. Bias in allocation among risky and uncertain prospects: Partition-dependence, unit- dependence, and procedure-dependence.  Working paper, University of Muenster.

Fox, C.R., Long, A, & Hadar, L., Erner, C.  Unpacking decision weights in decision from description and experience. Manuscript in preparation, UCLA Anderson School.